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Abstract: In the absence of ‘‘hard’’ neurophysiologic markers, the burden of proof for establishing 
conscious awareness in individuals who sustain severe brain injury lies in behavioral assessment. Because 
behavior represents indirect evidence of consciousness, reliance on behavioral markers presents 
signiﬁcant challenges and may lead to misdiagnosis. Detection of conscious awareness is confounded 
by numerous factors including ﬂuctuations in arousal level, difﬁculty differentiating reﬂexive or 
involuntary movement from intentional behavior, underlying sensory and motor impairments, and 
medication side effects. When an ambiguous behavior is observed, the onus falls to the clinician to 
determine where along the continuum of unconsciousness to consciousness, it lies. This paper 
(1) summarizes the current diagnostic criteria for coma, the vegetative state, and the minimally conscious 
state, (2) describes current behavioral assessment methods, (3) discusses the limitations of behavioral 
assessment techniques, (4) reviews recent applications of functional neuroimaging in the assessment of 
patients with disorders of consciousness, and (5) concludes with a case study that illustrates the disparity 
between behavioral and functional neuroimaging ﬁndings that may be encountered in this population. 
Keywords: disorders of consciousness; vegetative state; minimally conscious state; assessment scales; brain 
injury; rehabilitation 
Progress in intensive care has increased the time and pass through different stages before fully 
number of patients who survive severe acute or partially recovering consciousness. One of the 
brain injury. Most recover from coma within the most challenging problems facing clinicians is 
ﬁrst 2 weeks after the insult, others require more understanding the natural history of recovery 
from severe brain injury. In clinical practice, it is 
often difﬁcult to detect unambiguous signs of$Both Joseph T. Giacino and Caroline Schnakers have 
contributed equally to this study. consciousness in patients with limited behavioral 
repertoires. This complication is reﬂected in�Corresponding author. 
frequent misdiagnoses (Andrews et al., 1996;Tel.: 732-205-1461; Fax: 732-632-1584;
E-mail: jgiacino@solarishs.org Childs et al., 1993). Assessment of residual brain
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function in severely brain-injured patients is 
difﬁcult because motor responses may be impaired, 
inconsistent, or easily exhausted. For these reasons, 
diagnostic criteria and standardized behavioral 
scales have been developed to facilitate the 
assessment of consciousness in patients recovering 
from coma. Other techniques such as functional 
neuroimaging can provide additional information 
to gauge cognitive processing and aid in diagnostic 
assessment. This paper (1) summarizes the current 
diagnostic criteria for coma, the vegetative state 
(VS), and the minimally conscious state (MCS), 
(2) describes current behavioral assessment 
methods, (3) discusses the limitations of behavioral 
assessment techniques, (4) reviews recent applica­
tions of functional neuroimaging in the assessment 
of patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC), 
and (5) concludes with a case study that illustrates 
the disparity between behavioral and functional 
neuroimaging ﬁndings that may be encountered in 
this population. 
Diagnostic criteria
It is essential to distinguish DOC’s such as coma, 
VS, and MCS (see Table 1) as there are important 
differences in recovery course and outcome. 
These disorders must also be distinguished from 
the locked-in syndrome (LIS) and brain death as 
these conditions have overlapping features, 
although neither represents a DOC. 
Coma
Plum and Posner (1966) deﬁned coma as a 
pathological state marked by severe and pro­
longed dysfunction of vigilance and consciousness. 
This state results from global brain dysfunction 
(most often due to diffuse axonal injury following 
traumatic brain injury), or from a lesion limited to 
brainstem structures involving the reticular acti­
vating system. The distinguishing feature of coma 
is the continuous absence of eye-opening (spon­
taneously or following stimulation). There is no 
evidence of visual ﬁxation or pursuit, even after 
manual eye-opening. No voluntary motor beha­
vior is observed and behavioral responses are 
limited to reﬂex activity only. Brain electrical 
activity is observed, albeit characterized by slow 
frequency bands (i.e., mostly delta and theta 
activity). This state must last at least 1 h to be 
differentiated from a transient DOC such as 
syncope, acute confusion, or delirium. Prolonged 
coma is rare as this condition usually resolves 
within 2–4 weeks, most often evolving into VS or 
MCS. 
Vegetative state
The term ‘‘vegetative state’’ denotes reactivation 
of autonomic functions (e.g., cardio-vascular, 
respiratory, and thermoregulation functions) with 
concomitant reemergence of the sleep–wake cycle 
(i.e., periods of spontaneous eyes opening). VS 
often results from trauma-induced bi-hemispheric 
injury involving the white matter or from bilateral 
lesions in the thalamus with sparing of the 
brainstem, hypothalamus, and basal ganglia (Plum 
and Posner, 1983). Behaviorally, there is no 
response to verbal order and, although moaning 
may occur, there is no intelligible speech (The 
Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, 1994). Infre­
quently, behaviors such as inappropriate smiling, 
crying, or grimacing, and even randomly pro­
duced single words have been reported in patients 
diagnosed with VS (Schiff et al., 1999; Working 
Party of the Royal College of Physicians, 2003). 
With serial multimodal assessment, the probabil­
ity that these behaviors are not voluntary or goal 
directed can be further investigated, although not 
proven. When this state lasts 1 month or more, the 
term ‘‘persistent VS’’ has been applied (The 
Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, 1994). In view 
of the high rate of recovery of consciousness after 
1 month (Choi et al., 1994; Giacino and Kalmar, 
1997), and well-documented cases of late recovery 
(Childs and Mercer, 1996), the American Con­
gress of Rehabilitation Medicine has recom­
mended that the term ‘‘persistent VS’’ be 
abandoned in favor of documenting the cause of 
the VS (trauma, anoxia) and the length of time 
post-onset, as both carry prognostic information 
(American Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine, 
1995). When VS lasts more than 3 months after 
non-traumatic brain injury, and 1 year following 
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Table 1. Diagnostic criteria for brain death, coma, vegetative and minimally conscious states, and locked-in syndrome 
Consciousness level Diagnostic criteria Reference(s) 
Brain death No arousal/eye-opening Medical Consultants on the 
No behavioral signs of awareness Diagnosis of Death (1981) 
Apnea 
Loss of brain functions (brainstem reﬂexes) 
Coma No arousal/eye-opening Plum and Posner (1966) 
No behavioral signs of awareness 
Impaired spontaneous breathing 
Impaired brainstem reﬂexes 
No vocalizations 
W1 h  
Vegetative state Arousal/spontaneous or stimulus-induced eye opening The Multi-Society Task Force 
No behavioral signs of awareness on PVS (1994) 
Preserved spontaneous breathing 
Preserved brainstem reﬂexes 
No purposeful behaviors 
No language production or comprehension 
W1 month: persistent vegetative 
Compatible Working Party of the Royal 
Grimaces to pain College of Physicians (2003) 
Localization to sounds 
Atypical but compatible
Visual ﬁxation 
Response to threat 
Inappropriate single words 
Minimally conscious state Arousal/spontaneous eye-opening Giacino et al. (2002) 
Fluctuating but reproducible behavioral signs of awareness 
Response to command 
Environmentally contingent emotional/motor responses 
Object localization and manipulation 
Sustained visual ﬁxation and pursuit 
Intelligible verbalization 
Intentional but unreliable communication 
Emergence from MCS
Functional communication 
Functional object use 
Locked-in syndrome Arousal/spontaneous eye-opening American Congress of 
Preserved cognitive functions Rehabilitation Medicine (1995) 
Communication via eye gaze 
Anarthria 
Tetraplegia 
traumatic etiologies, VS can be considered ‘‘per­
manent’’ (The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, 
1994). 
Minimally conscious state
MCS is characterized by the presence of in­
consistent but clearly discernible behavioral 
signs of consciousness (Giacino et al., 2002). 
Command-following, recognizable yes–no res­
ponses, and intelligible verbalizations represent 
the clearest evidence of conscious awareness. In 
contrast to patients in VS who may display random 
episodes of crying or smiling, in MCS, these 
behaviors occur in contingent relation to appro­
priate environmental triggers. Reemergence of 
visual pursuit appears to be an early behavioral 
marker of the transition from VS to MCS (Giacino 
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and Whyte, 2005). Although behavior may ﬂuc­
tuate across examinations, at least one of these 
signs must be replicated within a given examina­
tion to meet the diagnostic criteria for MCS. 
Regarding prognosis, the probability of func­
tional recovery at 1 year following traumatic brain 
injury is signiﬁcantly more favorable relative to 
VS (50% vs. 3% attaining moderate disability). 
Some patients in MCS progress slowly while 
others remain in this condition permanently (Fins 
et al., 2007). It is also important to recognize that, 
unlike VS, clearly deﬁned temporal parameters 
for recovery do not yet exist (Lammi et al., 2005), 
and there is wide heterogeneity in the degree of 
functional recovery ultimately attained. Emer­
gence from MCS occurs when the patient is able 
to reliably communicate through verbal or ges­
tural yes–no responses, or is able to demonstrate 
use of two or more objects (e.g., hairbrush, cup) in 
a functional manner (Giacino et al., 2002). 
Differential diagnosis
Two additional conditions characterized by beha­
vioral unresponsiveness must be differentiated 
from VS and MCS. In the ﬁrst, consciousness is 
retained, while in the second, it is permanently 
lost. 
Locked-in syndrome
LIS is marked by tetraplegia and anarthria in the 
setting of near-normal to normal cognitive func­
tion (American Congress of Rehabilitation Med­
icine, 1995). This state is caused by a lesion 
involving the ventral pons and, in 60% of cases, is 
due to basilar thrombosis. Because patients with 
LIS have spontaneous eyes opening, but are 
unable to speak or move the extremities, this 
state can be confused with VS because of the 
conﬂuence of behavioral signs. On average, the 
diagnosis of LIS is not established until 2.5 
months post-onset. There is evidence that family 
members tend to detect signs of consciousness 
(55% of cases) prior to medical staff (23% 
of cases) (Laureys et al., 2005a). Classic LIS 
consists of complete paralysis of the orobuccal 
musculature and all four extremities, however, 
vertical eyes movements are spared, allowing non­
verbal communication through directional gaze. 
Perceptual functions are also usually spared as 
ascending corticospinal axons remain intact 
(American Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine, 
1995). Bauer et al. (1979) have described multiple 
varieties of LIS, including the incomplete form in 
which there is residual motor activity (frequently, 
ﬁnger or head movement), and total LIS, in which 
there is complete immobility including both 
horizontal and vertical eye movements. Data on 
life expectancy suggest that some patients with 
LIS live 12 or more years post-onset. Surprisingly, 
chronic LIS patients rate their quality of life 
similarly to the healthy population (Laureys et al., 
2005a). In the absence of other structural or 
functional brain abnormalities, patients with LIS 
are generally able to make independent decisions 
and communicate their preferences (Schnakers et 
al., 2008b; Smart et al., 2008). 
Brain death
Brain death is a condition in which there is 
‘‘irreversible unconsciousness with complete loss 
of brain function.’’ It is marked by the presence of 
apnea and the lack of any behavioral response to 
the environment (Medical Consultants on the 
Diagnosis of Death, 1981). Generally, an electro­
encephalogram is completed to demonstrate an 
iso-electrical signal reﬂecting the absence of 
electrical brain activity. Transcranial Doppler 
studies reveal the absence of cerebral blood ﬂow. 
Finally, functional imaging, using cerebral perfu­
sion tracers and single photon emission tomogra­
phy (SPECT), illustrate the ‘‘empty skull’’ sign in 
which the ‘‘whole brain’’ is inactive (Facco et al., 
1998). After excluding brain dysfunction due to 
drug toxicity or hyperthermia, a ﬁnal diagnosis 
can be established after 6–24 h. 
Behavioral assessment methods
Twenty-ﬁve years ago, Plum and Posner (1983) 
noted that, ‘‘the limits of consciousness are hard 
to deﬁne satisfactorily and we can only infer the 
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self-awareness of others by their appearance and 
their acts’’. As noted, behavioral observation 
remains the ‘‘gold standard’’ for detecting signs of 
consciousness in severely brain-injured patients. 
Preservation of arousal is a necessary but insufﬁ­
cient condition for consciousness (see Fig. 1). The 
search for consciousness rests on the demonstra­
tion of behavioral qualities that are distinct from 
simple reﬂexes. Behavioral assessment may not, 
however, deﬁnitively distinguish between beha­
viors associated with the state of arousal and those 
linked to conscious awareness. This dilemma is 
illustrated in the difﬁculty clinicians often have in 
differentiating reﬂexive eye blinks from eye-
closure to command. Additionally, consciousness 
may not be a static phenomenon and may be better 
conceptualized as a continuum. It is possible, for 
example, for a patient in coma to rapidly evolve 
into VS, gradually transition to MCS, and subse­
quently lapse back into VS (Giacino and Trott, 
2004; Majerus et al., 2005). 
Behavioral scales
Numerous behavioral rating scales have been 
developed and validated to assess level of 
BRAIN DEATH, VEGETATIVE 
COMA STATE 
consciousness and establish diagnosis (Majerus 
et al., 2005). In this section, we brieﬂy review 
instruments commonly used in the acute and 
rehabilitation settings. 
Acute setting
The Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) remains the 
most widely used scale in trauma and acute care 
settings. The GCS was the ﬁrst validated rating 
scale developed to monitor level of consciousness 
in the intensive care unit (Teasdale and Jennett, 
1974). This scale is relatively brief and can easily 
be incorporated into routine clinical care. It 
includes three subscales that address arousal level, 
motor function, and verbal abilities. Subscales 
scores are added and yield a total score ranging 
from 3 to 15. Despite its widespread use, the GCS 
has been criticized for variable inter-rater agree­
ment and problems deriving scores in patients 
with ocular trauma, tracheostomy, or ventilatory 
support (McNett, 2007). 
The Full Outline of UnResponsiveness (FOUR) 
scale was recently developed to replace the GCS 
to assess severely brain-injured patients in inten­







































































Fig. 1. Behavioral observation assesses two dimensions of consciousness: arousal and awareness. In brain death and coma, both 
dimensions are absent. In the vegetative state, arousal level is relatively preserved in the absence of signs of awareness. In the 
minimally conscious state, both dimensions are present although behavioral signs of awareness often ﬂuctuate. In the locked-in 
syndrome, both dimensions are fully preserved despite complete loss of speech and motor functions. 
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The scale is comprised of four subscales assessing 
motor and ocular responses, brainstem reﬂexes, 
and breathing. The total score ranges from 0 to 16. 
Unlike the GCS, the FOUR does not assess 
verbal functions to accommodate the high number 
of intubated patients in intensive care. A score 
of 0 on the FOUR assumes the absence of 
brainstem reﬂexes and breathing and, therefore, 
helps to diagnose brain death. The scale also 
monitors recovery of autonomic functions and 
tracks emergence from VS. The FOUR is speciﬁ­
cally designed to detect patients with LIS as it uses 
oculomotor commands that exploit vertical eye 
movements and eye blinks, both of which are 
preserved in LIS. 
The Wessex Head Injury Matrix (WHIM) (Shiel 
et al., 2000) was developed to capture changes in 
patients in VS through emergence from post­
traumatic amnesia. This tool is particularly sensi­
tive to detecting changes in patients in MCS not 
captured by traditional scales such as the GCS 
(Majerus and Van der Linden, 2000). Shiel and 
collaborators longitudinally followed 97 severely 
brain-injured patients recovering from coma to 
create the WHIM. WHIM items were ordered 
according to the sequence of recovery observed in 
these patients. The 62-item WHIM’s six sections 
assess arousal level and concentration, visual 
consciousness (i.e., visual pursuit), communica­
tion, cognition (i.e., memory and spatiotemporal 
orientation), and social behaviors. The WHIM 
score represents the rank of the most complex 
behavior observed. 
The Sensory Modality Assessment and Rehabili-
tation Technique (SMART) (Gill-Thwaites, 1997) 
was developed to identify signs of consciousness 
observed during ‘‘sensory stimulations programs’’ 
intended to support cerebral plasticity and improve 
level of consciousness (Wood, 1991). The SMART 
assesses eight modalities including visual, auditory, 
tactile, olfactory and gustatory sensation, motor 
functions, communication, and arousal level. The 
SMART is a hierarchical scale consisting of ﬁve 
response levels (‘‘absence of response’’ — Level 1; 
‘‘reﬂex response’’ — Level 2; ‘‘withdrawal 
response’’ — Level 3; ‘‘localization response’’ — 
Level 4; ‘‘discriminative response’’ — Level 5). 
The SMART has previously been shown to have 
very good validity and reliability in a population of 
60 patients diagnosed as being in a VS or in a MCS 
(Gill-Thwaites and Munday, 2004). 
The JFK Coma Recovery Scale (CRS) was 
originally developed by investigators from the JFK 
Johnson Rehabilitation Institute in 1991 (Giacino 
et al., 1991). The scale was revised and republished 
in 2004 as the JFK Coma Recovery Scale-Revised 
(CRS-R) (Giacino et al., 2004). The purpose of the 
CRS-R is to assist with differential diagnosis, 
prognostic assessment, and treatment planning in 
patients with DOC. The scale consists of 23 items 
that comprise 6 subscales addressing auditory, 
visual, motor, oromotor, communication, and 
arousal functions (see Table 2). CRS-R subscales 
are comprised of hierarchically arranged items 
associated with brain stem, subcortical, and cortical 
processes. The lowest item on each subscale 
represents reﬂexive activity while the highest items 
represent cognitively mediated behaviors. Scoring 
is standardized and based on the presence or 
absence of operationally deﬁned behavioral 
responses to speciﬁc sensory stimuli. Psychometric 
studies indicate that the CRS-R meets minimal 
standards for measurement and evaluation tools 
designed for use in interdisciplinary medical 
rehabilitation. Adequate inter-rater and test–retest 
reliability have been established indicating that the 
CRS-R can be administered reliably by trained 
examiners and produces reasonably stable scores 
over repeated assessments. Validity analyses sup­
port use of the scale as an index of neurobehavioral 
function and have shown that the CRS-R is capable 
of discriminating patients in MCS from those in VS 
which is of critical importance in establishing 
prognosis and formulating treatment interventions 
(Schnakers et al., 2006, 2008a; Vanhaudenhuyse 
et al., 2008). Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, German, 
French, Dutch, Norwegian, and Danish translations 
of the CRS-R are available. 
Limitations of behavioral assessment
Differentiating between MCS and VS can be 
challenging as voluntary and reﬂexive behaviors 
can be difﬁcult to distinguish and subtle signs of 
consciousness may be missed (Majerus et al., 
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Table 2. Coma Recovery Scale-Revised record sheet 
Auditory Function Scale 
4 — Consistent movement to commanda 
3 — Reproducible movement to commanda 
2 — Localization to sound 
1 — Auditory startle 
0 — None 
Visual Function Scale 
5 — Object recognitiona 
4 — Object localization: Reachinga 
3 — Pursuit eye movementsa 
2 — Fixationa 
1 — Visual startle 
0 — None 
Motor Function Scale 
6 — Functional object useb 
5 — Automatic motor responsea 
4 — Object manipulationa 
3 — Localization to noxious stimulationa 
2 — Flexion withdrawal 
1 — Abnormal posturing 
0 — None/ﬂaccid 
Oromotor/Verbal Function Scale 
3 — Intelligible verbalizationa 
2 — Vocalization/oral movement 
1 — Oral reﬂexive movement 
0 — None 
Communication Scale 
2 — Functional: Accurateb 
1 — Non-functional: Intentionala 
0 — None 
Arousal Scale 
3 — Attentiona 
2 — Eye opening w/o stimulation 
1 — Eye opening with stimulation 
0 — Unarousable 
aDenotes MCS.
bDenotes emergence from MCS.
2005). Prior studies have shown that 37–43% of 
patients with DOC are erroneously diagnosed 
with VS (Andrews et al., 1996; Childs et al., 1993). 
The recent development of diagnostic criteria for 
MCS (Giacino et al., 2002) would reasonably be 
expected to reduce the incidence of misdiagnosis 
relative to the rates reported before these criteria 
were established (Jennett, 2005). However, a 
recent study found that 41% of patients believed 
to be in VS were misdiagnosed. This study also 
found that the majority of cases with an uncertain 
diagnosis were in MCS (89%), not in VS. Another 
10% diagnosed with MCS had actually emerged 
from this condition (Schnakers et al., 2009). 
The high rate of misdiagnosis reported by 
Schnakers and collaborators likely reﬂects different 
sources of variance. Variance in diagnostic accu­
racy may result from biases contributed by the 
examiner, patient, and environment. Examiner 
error may arise when the range of behaviors 
sampled is too narrow, response-time windows are 
over or under-inclusive, criteria for judging purpo­
seful responses are poorly deﬁned or not adhered 
to, and examinations are conducted too infre­
quently to capture the full range of behavioral 
ﬂuctuation. The use of standardized rating scales 
offers some protection from these errors, although 
failure to adhere to speciﬁc administration and 
scoring guidelines may jeopardize diagnostic accu­
racy (Schnakers et al., 2009). The second source of 
variance concerns the patient. Fluctuations in 
arousal level, fatigue, subclinical seizure activity, 
occult illness, pain, cortical sensory deﬁcits (e.g., 
cortical blindness/deafness), motor impairment 
(e.g., generalized hypotonus, spasticity, or paraly­
sis), or cognitive (e.g., aphasia, apraxia, agnosia) 
disturbance can conspire to confound accurate 
diagnostic assessment, constitute a bias to the 
behavioral assessment, and therefore decrease the 
probability to observe signs of consciousness. 
Finally, the environment in which the patient is 
evaluated may bias assessment ﬁndings. Paralytic 
and sedating medications, restricted range of 
movement stemming from restraints and immobi­
lization techniques, poor positioning and excessive 
ambient noise, heat or light can decrease or distort 
voluntary behavioral responses. 
Some sources of error can be avoided, but this 
is not always possible or within the examiner’s 
control. This is particularly troubling as clinical 
management, from treatment of pain to end-of­
life decision-making, often depends on behavioral 
observations. To address this problem, neuroima­
ging procedures have begun to assume an 
adjunctive role in the diagnostic assessment of 
patients with DOC. 
Functional neuroimaging
Functional neuroimaging techniques such as 
positron emission tomography (PET) and 
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functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
can provide an objective index of brain activity 
at rest and during active cognitive processing. 
Thus, these techniques are well equipped to 
identify covert cognitive processes in patients 
who are otherwise incapable of intelligible or 
sustained behavioral expression, and offer com­
plementary information to bedside examination 
ﬁndings. 
In vegetative patients, brain hypometabolism 
appears similar to individuals in coma, with a 
50–60% decreased global metabolic rate relative 
to healthy individuals. Hypometabolic activity is 
further reduced to 60–70% in patients in ‘‘perma­
nent vegetative state’’ (Tommasino et al., 1995). 
In VS, the frontoparietal network, including the 
parietal, mesio-frontal, prefrontal, parieto-tem­
poral, precuneus, and posterior cingular cortex 
are disproportionately disturbed (Laureys, 2004; 
Laureys et al., 2004a). In MCS, these regions 
remain relatively well preserved and their 
functional connectivity is generally retained 
(Laureys et al., 2000). Prior investigations have 
demonstrated that, in VS, auditory or nociceptive 
stimuli activate primary cortices only, sugge­
sting failure to integrate this information and 
consequently, absence of conscious perception 
(Laureys, 2005). 
The metabolic pattern differs signiﬁcantly for 
patients in MCS. In spite of a global hypometabo­
lism measured at 20–40% of normal (Schiff 
et al., 2005), the activity in precuneus and posterior 
cingular cortex (the most activated regions during 
wakefulness and the least activated under general 
anesthesia or during deep slow sleep) was greater 
as compared to rates noted in patients diagnosed 
with VS (Laureys et al., 2005b). Similar ﬁnd­
ings have been noted in functional imaging studies 
employing auditory or noxious stimulation 
(Bekinschtein et al., 2004; Boly et al., 2004, 2008; 
Laureys et al., 2004b; Schiff et al., 2005). Perhaps 
most importantly, there is evidence that patients in 
MCS retain higher functional connectivity between 
the secondary auditory cortex and prefronto­
temporal associative cortices (Boly et al., 2005), 
corroborating the expectation that information 
processing is more highly integrated in MCS 
relative to VS. 
Case report (AZ)
A 20-year-old right-handed college student 
(referred to here as AZ) was admitted for a 
course of acute neurorehabilitation approximately 
3 months after sustaining a severe hypoxic-
ischemic brain injury related to cardio-respiratory 
arrest caused by a drug overdose. He was found 
pulseless by at the scene by the emergency 
medical team and required cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation for 10 min before cardioversion was 
achieved. The initial CT scan was normal but a 
follow-up scan on day two showed global white 
matter ischemic changes. The acute medical 
course was complicated by central fevers and 
recurrent infections. Medical records from the 
acute care setting noted that the patient remained 
unresponsive across the 3-month course, however, 
family members reported observing episodes of 
simple command-following and occasional periods 
of appropriate laughter. 
On admission to the rehabilitation unit, ﬂexion 
contractures were noted in all four extremities 
(upper greater than lower) and there was no 
spontaneous purposeful movement. Arousal was 
well maintained and the auditory startle reﬂex was 
intact but there was no evidence of auditory 
localization. On formal command-following trials 
using the CRS-R, there was questionable move­
ment of the right toes, however, these responses 
could not be clearly differentiated from random 
movement, and there was no other indication of 
proximal or axial movement to command. To 
further investigate verbal comprehension in the 
setting of severe contractures, vocalization 
commands were administered (i.e., ‘‘say ah’’). 
Vocalizations were noted in association with 
increased oral movement, despite the absence 
of any spontaneous vocalizations prior to pre­
sentation of the commands. No evidence of verbal 
or gestural communication was observed in 
response to simple yes/no questions. Assessment 
of visuoperceptual functions failed to reveal any 
evidence of object recognition (via eye gaze) and 
there was a single documented episode of visual 
pursuit in response to horizontal and vertical 
movement of a mirror. Noxious stimulation 
applied to the upper extremities produced facial 
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grimace and slight ﬂexion of both lower extremi­
ties only. 
Over the course of the next 10 months, AZ was 
evaluated weekly using the JFK CRS-R. Arousal 
(i.e., eye-opening) was generally well maintained 
and, despite anecdotal reports of occasional visual 
ﬁxation, there were no documented episodes of 
either ﬁxation or pursuit on formal examination. 
Active and passive range of movement remained 
severely compromised due to increased tone and 
spasticity involving all four extremities. The 
severity of the neuromuscular impairment placed 
signiﬁcant constraints on the assessment of 
command-following. There were, however, infre­
quent reports of command-following by family 
members and treating staff, although these 
behaviors could not be replicated on standardized 
assessments performed during the 10-month 
observational period. Incomprehensible vocaliza­
tions and crying episodes were frequently noted, 
but there were no intelligible verbalizations or 
discernible gestural communication signs at any 
time. Examination ﬁndings were most compatible 
with VS, although diagnostic certainty was low in 
view of the occasional manifestation of behaviors 
associated with conscious awareness. Table 3 
shows AZ’s CRS-R subscale scores on admission 
and on follow-up at 3, 6, and 11 months post-
onset. 
In light of the characteristically infrequent, 
inconsistent, and qualitatively ambiguous signs of 
consciousness noted in this case, AZ was enrolled 
in an IRB-approved fMRI study designed to 
investigate neurophysiologic changes induced by 
exposure to meaningful sensory stimuli in patients 
with DOC. Specialized ‘‘passive-stimulation’’ para­
digms were administered to monitor changes in 
cortical networks associated with language and 
visual processing (Hirsch et al., 2001). In the 
passive language paradigm, AZ listened to familiar 
personal stories recounted by a family member 
(e.g., vacation, wedding). Familiar voices and 
events were employed to facilitate sustained 
attention. Thereafter, he was exposed to a second 
condition in which the narratives were time-
reversed rendering them unintelligible. Results 
revealed robust language-speciﬁc activation during 
both the forward and reversed conditions, 
mirroring previously reported ﬁndings in healthy 
volunteers (Schiff et al., 2005). Extensive clusters 
of activity were observed extending bilaterally over 
the transverse temporal gyrus, the middle and 
superior temporal gyrus, and portions of the 
precentral and postcentral gyrus bilaterally. More 
importantly, there were several clusters of activity 
unique to the forward speech condition observed 
following subtraction of the reversed from the 
forward condition. Speciﬁc areas of activity tied to 
high-level language processing included the left 
superior temporal gyrus (i.e., Wernicke’s area), the 
left supramarginal and superior frontal gyri, and 
the right medial frontal gyrus. Unexpectedly, both 
conditions also elicited activity in the occipital 
cortex (cuneus and lingual gyrus), raising the 
possibility of language comprehension accompa­
nied by visual imagery (see Fig. 2). 
A second ‘‘passive viewing’’ paradigm was 
presented to engage the visual processing net­
work. A series of back-projected visual images 
were presented under three conditions. Condition 
1 consisted of a combination of familiar (i.e., 
family members and close friends) and unfamiliar 
faces, condition 2 was comprised of landscape 
scenes, and condition 3 utilized ﬂashing checker­
boards. AZ was exposed to these three forms of 
visual stimuli to gauge the selectivity of the 
activation as well as the degree of preservation 
of the central nodes comprising this system. Prior 
studies with healthy volunteers have demon­
strated that while each of these stimuli produces 
visual network activity, faces and landscapes 
activate mutually exclusive structures (i.e., fusi­
form face area and parahippocampal place area, 
respectively) (Epstein et al., 1999; Kanwisher 
et al., 1997). Findings showed strong activation 
of the primary visual cortex bilaterally across all 
three conditions. Of more importance, facial 
stimuli engaged the fusiform face area of the 
right inferior temporal gyrus as well as the lingual 
gyrus bilaterally and right precuneus, consistent 
with high-level processing of faces. The land­
scapes elicited activity in the parahippocampal 
gyrus, lingual gyrus bilaterally, and bilateral 
precuneus, approximating the response observed 
in healthy volunteers exposed to landscape scenes 
(see Fig. 3). 
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Table 3. CRS-R response proﬁle on admission to rehabilitation and 3, 6, and 11 months post-injury in patient ‘‘AZ,’’ a 20-year-old 
male with severe anoxic encephalopathy 
JFK Coma Recovery Scale – Revised (record form) 
Patient: BB Date 
ADM 3 months 6 months 11 months 
Auditory Function Scale 
4 — Consistent movement to commanda 
3 — Reproducible movement to commanda 
2 — Localization to sound + + + 
1 — Auditory startle + 
0 — None 
Visual Function Scale 
5 — Object recognitiona 
4 — Object localization: Reachinga 
3 — Pursuit eye movementsa + 
2 — Fixationa + 
1 — Visual startle 
0 — None + + 
Motor Function Scale 
6 — Functional object useb 
5 — Automatic motor responsea 
4 — Object manipulationa 
3 — Localization to noxious stimulationa 
2 — Flexion withdrawal + + + + 
1 — Abnormal posturing 
0 — None/ﬂaccid 
Oromotor/Verbal Function Scale 
3 — Intelligible verbalizationa 
2 — Vocalization/oral movement + + + + 
1 — Oral reﬂexive movement 
0 — None 
Communication Scale 
2 — Functional: Accurateb 
1 — Non-functional: Intentionala 
0 — None + + + + 
Arousal Scale 
3 — Attentiona 
2 — Eye opening w/o stimulation + + + 
1 — Eye opening with stimulation + 
0 — Unarousable 
Total score 7 8 10 10 
aDenotes MCS.
bDenotes emergence from MCS.
What do these ﬁndings mean?
The results of these studies suggest that some 
commonly held notions about brain–behavior 
relationships should be revisited in this patient 
population. Perhaps most importantly, they 
clearly illustrate the wide discrepancy that may 
exist between observable behavior and the under­
lying neurophysiologic processes believed to 
support cognitive processing. Such ﬁndings also 
force us to consider the unsettling possibility that 
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Fig. 2. Regions of activation noted in patient AZ when exposed to spoken narratives. The top panel shows robust activation in left 
temporal association cortex observed during presentation of comprehensible speech. In the middle panel, regions of activation are 
well maintained during exposure to unintelligible speech. In the bottom panel, several clusters of activity unique to the forward 
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Fig. 3. Regions of activation noted in patient AZ in response to visual stimuli. The top panel shows bilateral activation in the primary 
cortex observed during exposure to ﬂashing checkerboards. In the middle panel, activation of the fusiform face area is noted during 
exposure to familiar and unfamiliar faces. The bottom panel shows activation of the parahippocampal place area during presentation 
of landscape scenes. 
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preserved in this case, but lack a mode of 
expression as the consequence of severely dys­
functional sensory and motor systems. In a sense, 
these ﬁndings may reﬂect a ‘‘functional’’ LIS. 
Alternatively, the selective activation of key 
nodes in the language and visual networks may 
stem from a more extensively hard-wired neural 
network than has traditionally been assumed. This 
premise is supported by recent evidence from 
electrophysiological and other fMRI activation 
studies. Employing an event-related cognitive 
evoked potential paradigm, Perrin et al. (2006) 
detected a P300 response in three of ﬁve patients 
diagnosed with VS who listened to their own 
ﬁrst name versus an unfamiliar name. Similarly, 
Coleman et al. (2007) found evidence of extensive 
activation in temporal association cortices in three 
vegetative patients presented with meaningful 
speech (i.e., high and low semantically ambiguous 
sentences) versus unintelligible noise. The con­
trast between intelligible speech and unintelligible 
speech sounds provided an opportunity to parse 
brain regions involved in processing acoustic as 
well as semantic components of speech from those 
responsible for processing elementary speech 
components only. These studies suggest that 
automatic speech recognition processes mediated 
by surviving cortical association areas may be 
preserved in the absence of conscious awareness. 
In an effort to circumvent the ‘‘automatic 
versus effortful’’ processing problem, investiga­
tors have relinquished their reliance on passive-
stimulation paradigms in favor of adopting those 
that require active processing. Unlike their 
passive counterparts, active stimulation paradigms 
direct the subject to perform a cognitive activity 
on cue. Owen et al. (2006) devised a hierarchical 
fMRI scanning paradigm in which subjects were 
directed to imagine either playing tennis or 
walking around the rooms of their home. Results 
in normal controls indicated distinct network 
activation tied to each instructional set. When 
subjects were instructed to imagine playing tennis, 
robust activity was observed in the supplementary 
motor area. In contrast, when subjects were 
verbally prompted to navigate the rooms of the 
house, activity shifted to the posterior parietal, 
parahippocampal gyrus, and lateral premotor 
regions. Surprisingly, the same ﬁndings were 
observed in a patient whose behavioral proﬁle 
was reportedly indicative of VS. The authors 
suggested that, despite the behaviorally unrespon­
sive presentation on bedside examination, the 
shift in activation patterns coupled to the verbal 
instructions, constituted evidence that the patient 
was capable of comprehending language and 
executing goal-directed behavior. In a similar 
vein, Schnakers et al. (2008c) recorded event-
related potentials while subjects either passively 
listened to their own ﬁrst name or received 
instructions to count the number of times they 
heard their name. The authors reported that 
healthy controls and patients in MCS, but not 
those in VS, demonstrated a larger P300 in 
response to their own name in both the active 
and passive conditions. The P300 differential was 
viewed as evidence of intentional compliance with 
task instructions. As active paradigms such as 
these continue to be reﬁned, clinicians will be able 
to convincingly discern whether the capacity for 
cognitive processing is intact without relying on 
overt behavior analysis. 
Although the standard of the ﬁeld is now 
moving toward active paradigms to infer con­
scious processing, it is unlikely that all patients 
with DOC will beneﬁt from these paradigms. 
Those least likely to beneﬁt occupy opposite ends 
of the severity spectrum. Patients with very little 
residual brain activity who fail to show activation 
on passive paradigms (consistent with VS), as well 
as cases like AZ who demonstrate robust activity 
(consistent with MCS) but, for unclear reasons are 
unable to perform effortful tasks, will not be able 
to engage in active paradigms. Therefore, we 
believe that both passive and active paradigms 
will continue to play a role in capturing the full 
range of cognitive processing capacity character­
izing patients with DOC. 
Conclusion
Recovery of consciousness is usually gradual, 
sometimes marked by emergence of clear beha­
vioral signs, but more often by subtle improve­
ments. Additionally, bedside assessment of 
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residual cognitive function is often difﬁcult 
because of poor arousal, motor impairment, 
sedating medications, and other confounding 
factors. Nonetheless, every effort should be made 
to recognize subtle signs of consciousness as early 
as possible in the recovery course to avoid 
misdiagnosis. An accurate diagnosis is crucial not 
only for daily management (particularly, pain 
treatment) and end-of-life decisions, but also for 
prognosis as outcome from MCS is signiﬁcantly 
more favorable on average, relative to VS. 
Knowledge of accepted diagnostic criteria and 
reliance on validated behavioral assessment scales 
enhance diagnostic and prognostic accuracy, and 
facilitate clinical management decisions. Contin­
ued development of electrophysiological and 
functional neuroimaging paradigms designed to 
detect voluntary brain activity in patients with 
minimal behavioral output is expected to reduce 
diagnostic error, increase prognostic speciﬁcity, 
and foster the development of novel interventions 
to promote recovery. 
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